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In the . Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GLORIA G. FENTON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CEDAR LUMBER & HA.RDW ARE 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 10238 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
The plaintiff-respondent agrees with the statement 
of the nature of the case in the brief of the defendant-
appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The plaintiff-respondent agrees with the statement 
of disposition in the lower court as presented by the de-
fendant-appellant. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff-respondent seeks an affirmance of the 
action of the lower court quieting title to the disputed 
property in the plaintiff. 
srrATEMENT OF FACTS 
There are several differences from the standpoint 
of the parties in the statement of facts. The last sen-
tence of defendant-appellant's statement of facts, "The 
west two rods of the street property is not in dis 
pute and is O\vned by the appellant and we are only 
concerned with the east two rods or the half of the street 
adjoining the property of the plaintiff" is not entirely 
correct. The plaintiff-respondent has no claim on the 
west two rods of said street property. However, one Jim 
Urie, living at 425 Circleway Drive, is the adjoining prop-
erty owner to approximately the South 25 feet of the 
west part of the property that was the street property, 
and the remainder of said \vest side of said street proper-
ty is owned by one Ann J. Gardner. The undersigned i8. 
informed that said Jim Urie does intend to assert a claim 
to the portion of said west two rods that is adjacent to 
his property, and is uninformed as to the intention of 
said Ann ·J. Gardner. The only statement that the plain-
tiff .. respondent ·~rould be willing to be bound by in rela-
tion to the 'Nest two rods is that the plaintiff-respondent 
clailns no interest in said west two rods of said property. 
In addition, other item.s that should be included in 
the statement of facts are to be found in the Stipulation 
of the parties which '\vas filed on 3 July, 1964: 
"3. rrhat on the 15th of March, 1950, one Kate Wal-
lace made and executed a warranty deed to Cedar 
City a municipal corporation, whereby the land in 
' ~ question, together with t\vo rods on the West thereoJ. 
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was delivered to Cedar City Corporation. That said 
deed contained the following statement, in addition 
to the description: 'The above property is to be used 
for street and no other purpose.' That at some date 
after the 15th of March and prior to the 4th of May 
of 1950, at a date unknown to any of the parties, 
this deed was delivered by Kate Wallace to Cedar Ci-
ty and was recorded at the request of Cedar City. 
That at the time of said transaction, a street by the 
name of Dewey Avenue had been opened up North 
fron1 the captioned street, running between 200 South 
and 400 South in Cedar City, Utah. That it was the in-
tention of Cedar City Corporation to extend said Dew-
ey Avenue to the South, and Cedar City Corporation 
accepted said deed for this purpose. However, short-
ly after accepting said property, the defendant \Vhich 
had purchased from the said Kate Wallace's grantee 
all of the property now known as Valley Circle Sub-
division and sho'\vn on Page 3 of the abstract, opened 
negotiations with Cedar City Corporation to subdi-
vide the land South of the land in question, which 
culminated in January, 1952, in a subdivision shown 
on Page 3 of said abstract as 'Valley Circle Subdi-
vision,' and that this subdivision plan did not require 
the extension of De\vey Avenue on to the South, and 
had no road connecting with the land in question. 
That as a result of this subdivision, the use of the 
area in question for a street was no longer needed, 
and said area was never placed on the official map 
of said city as a street because of this, and any city 
equipment on said area was there only to control 
weeds and unsightliness, and was never there for 
the purpose of opening up a street or grading same. 
That said street has never at any time appeared on 
any official map as a city street and it has never at 
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any time been opened up and used as a street." 
That in addition certain other paragraphs out of 
said stipulation should be included in the fact situation, 
as follows: 
"5. That thereafter, Cedar C-ity Corporation by ordiw 
nance, vacated said land including the land in ques-
tion and the two r~1ds immediately West thereof, as a 
street. Same vvas done with the consent of the prop-
erty o\vner on the East, and also \vith the consent of 
the property owner on the West, with the exception 
of the South approximately 25 feet; that said ordi· 
nance \vas not contested in any way. That Entry No. 
42 of said abstract is a copy of said ordinance." 
"6. That on the 17th day of July, 1961, the plaintiff 
above na1ned acquired the land in question, together 
with four rods East thereof by quitclaim deed, That 
the grantors in said deed had owned the four rods 
adjoining on the east at the time of said vacation by 
Cedar City Corporation. That said quitclaim deed to 
the plaintiff dated 17 July, 1961 and recorded 20 July 
1961 did contain the property in question, being the 
East t\V·o rods of the area vacated as a street by said 
Cedar City ,Corporation. That the deed to the plaint-
iff is in said abstract as En~ry No. 43. That the prop-
erty abutting on the street on the west is owned 
by a party not a party to this action." 
"8. 'rhat the only claim of the defendant to the land 
in question is the quitclaim deed irom Kate Wallace 
shown as Entry No. :39 in said abstract. That said 
.. 
defendant makes no other claim to said property, 
other than this deed, and said defendant acknowl-
edges that it has no other clair.n to said property ex-
cept said deed." 
"9. 'rhat each of the parties have paid the taxes on 
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said property for the entire period since said street 
was vacated by Cedar City Corporation." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEF.,ENDANT-APPELLANT'S POINT 1 IS PRE-
DICATED UPON AN E·RRONEOUS ASSUMPTION 
THAT THE PLAIN'fiFF-RESPONDENT DOES NOT 
CLAIM THE FEE IN THE 'rWO ROD.S IN QUESTION. 
The fact stipulation which has been quoted by the 
plaintiff-respondent states the plaintiff's position in the 
l~~t oortion of Paragraph 7: 
"That the claim of the plaintiff to the land in ques-
tion is based upon her being a successor in interest 
to the TJarties who owned the property irnmediately 
to the East of said street at the time of said vaca-
tion of said street by Cedar City, and succeeding to 
their right in the East two rods of said street by vir~ 
tue of said deed from the grantors, who were adja-" 
cent property owners on the East of said street at the 
time of vacation of said street by Cedar City Corp-
oration." 
At no time has plaintiff taken the position that she 
is not the owner in fee in the East two rods, but claims 
all th~ rights that her predecessors in interest had at the 
time the deed was executed to her. 
This n1atter as to what the predecessor in interest 
of the plaintiff acquired upon vacation of the street by 
Cedar City by ordinance is governed under the provisions 
of Title 36-1-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, and Title 27-
1-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which was in effect at 
the time of the vacation by Cedar City, which reads as 
follows: 
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"27-l-7. Public Acquired Only Easement - Fee in 
Abutting Owner. By taking or accepting land for a 
highway the public acquires only the right-of-\vav 
and incidents necessary to enjoying and maintaining 
it. A transfer of land bounded by a high\vay passes 
the title of the person whose estate is transferred to 
the 1niddle of the highway." 
The 1943 Code which was in effect at the time of 
part of the actions of the parties reads the same. The 
various cases that are applicable to this item hold to the 
effect that this statute creates a presumption that when-
ever title to land adjoining a street is passed, this passes 
title to the center of the street and that this is a com-
plete presumtion and that the only way to overcome it 
is by evidence of the intent of the grantors otherwise. 
'fhis doctrine was enacted by the Utah State Supreme 
Court in interpreting this particular section in the case 
of Brown vs. Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, 36 
Utah 257, 102 Pac. 740, 1n which the Supren1e Court of 
Utah pointed out that the statute was declaratory of 
Common La\v, and that at Common l,aw a private con-
veyance of land bounded by or abutting on a highway, 
the fee to which belongs to the abutting owners, is 
presumed to convey in the highway to the center 
line thereof. This doctrine is affirmed in the case of 
Hummel vs. Young, 1 Utah 2d 237, 265 Pac. 2d 410, in 
which in addition to restating the doctrine of Brown vs. 
Oregon Short Line Railroad, it was pointed out that the 
presumption is rebutted only by clear evidence that the 
grantor did not intend to convey his interest lying in the 
highway. Under these conditions it should be presumed 
that the abandon1nent by Cedar City Corporation vested 
in the then owners of the abutting property title to the 
land in question to the center of the street, unless there 
is a clear and preponderant showing of intent by the pre-
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vious grantor otherwise. This is in accord with estab-
lished doctrine in Common Law as set forth in Section 
1.28, of Highways, \~olume 25, American Jurisprudence, 
at Page 424: 
"Where the public agency acquires the title to the 
fee in trust for public use, as distinguished, on the 
one hand, from an absolute and unqualified fee sim-
ple estate, and on the other from a mere easement 
of passage, the title, upon vacation or abandonment, 
likewise reverts to the then abutting o\vner, ... " 
The big question in the case at hand is whether or 
not one Kate Wallace intended to retain any reversionary 
interest in the land in question. Inasmuch as Kate Wal-
lace has passed to her reward, one must look to her prior 
actions to detern1ine her intent. This has been declared 
on the land in question a.nd the adjoining two rods west 
thereof -- that it was her intent to convey said property 
for a street. Prior to conveying said property for a street, 
she had completely divested herself of the property on 
the West. As to the adjoining property on the East, Kate 
Wallace, on Page 27 of the abstract on 23 October, 1942, 
deeded the adjoining property to Alice S. Smith, with 
reference that it \Vent to the East line of the public road 
as Platted on Plat A of the plat of said property and ad-
joining property made by Theron Ashcroft. There is no 
question that she did intend to convey to a street, and 
in this deed there is no reservation of any right whatso-
ever in the fee in the street. It is most significant that 
this was her intent because the second paragraph, "This 
deed is made subject to the express condition that no 
building shall be placed upon the above described prop-
erty less than 25 feet from the West boundary line there-
of, and that no dwelling house of a value less than 
$2,000.00 shall be erected upon said property~' requires 
a setback from the West because it is a street, and she 
intended to treat it as a street. 
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Of equal significance is the deed from Kate Wallace 
to Afton Duffin dated 13 April 1943 which is Entry No. 
28 of the abstract, wherein the description in the con-
veyance refers to the east line of the public road as the 
West line of the property, and again states, "to the east 
line of the public road as platted on Plat A of the plat 
of said property and adjoining property, made by Theron 
Ashcroft." This w·ould indicate that lVIr. Ashcroft had 
made a plat of the property that did have this area as a 
street. Also ·it is significant that in this deed the same 
condition concerning no dwelling house to be placed 
nearer than 25 feet of the west line of the property and 
Kate Wallace treating it as a street. Again in this deed to 
Afton Duffin, there was no reservation of any fee in the 
road whatsoever. 
Again it is significant in Entry No. 29 of the abstract 
that Afton Duffin in deeding to Alice S. Smith, the plain-
tiff's predecessor in interest, again referred to the east 
line of the public road as platted on Plat A of the plat of 
said property and adjoining property made by Theron 
Ashcroft, indicating that there was a plat that showed 
this as a street, and again had the reservation of 25 feet 
of the \vest line of said property. 
Of even greater significance is that on September 
17, 1946, this lady ~ate Wallace, apparently to remedy 
an error in previous deeds, again deeded to one Alice S. 
Smith, and specifically referred to the previous deeds as 
being in error. Again, Kate Waliace did not in any way 
claim or establish any reservation of the fee in the area 
of the street. If there \\:·as a street, these deeds certainly 
passed the fee in the adjoining property under the pro-
visions of Title 36-1-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which 
existed at that time. 
The next ite1n of interest is Entry No. 36 in the ab· 
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stract which is the warranty deed from Kate vVallace to 
Cedar City, which was a deed for the street property and 
contained the provision, ''The above property is to be 
used for street and no other purpose.'' Again one must 
note that this is a warranty deed and not an easement, 
and under these conditions there is no question that Kate 
Wallace felt that she had already passed on the fee to 
the adjoining property o\vners. Except for statute, if Kate 
Wallace had a fee, this would have passed it on to Ceda1 
City Corporation. Certainly there is no indication in this 
deed of any intent of one Kate Wallace to keep a ,fee in 
herself~ nor do the words that said property is to be .used 
for a street and no other purpose constitute a reversion 
to kate Wallace. By statute said document passed on 
only to Cedar City the right of use for a street, regard-
less of the language of this deed. It is to be noted that 
the date of this deed to Cedar City Corporation was 1~ 
March 1950 and same was recorded 4 May 1950. 
The next item of significance in the abstract is Entry 
No. 38. It is to be noted that this vvas after the deed to 
Cedar City of the street and that Cedar City had accepted 
and recorded the deed to the street prior thereto, and 
that the fact stipulation entered into by the parties was 
that Cedar City did accept this deed and did record same. 
Pertaining to Entry No. 38 of the abstract, it is a quit 
claim deed from Kate Wallace and her husband to Alice 
S. Smith of the· san1e property on the East, and again 
rAferred to the street . as platted by Theron Ashcroft, 
running West 132.9 feet and then running along the cap-
tioned property ·at the side of the street. Again it requires 
the property not to have a house within 25 feet from the 
west boundary thereof, and again says it is given to cor-
rect that certain "\Varranty deed made previously. 
The most significant transaction of the entire mat-
ter is shown in Entry No. 39, which is the deed from 
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Kate Wallace to Cedar Lumber and Hardware Company 
vvhich is the basis of the defendant's claim on the proper-
ty which follows the description of the street property, 
and is notarized by counsel for the defendant. The re .. 
cording of this deed shows no document stamps, and 
under these conditions it is presumed that nothing was 
paid for this deed. This is a quit claim deed which con-
tains the notation, "It is the intention of the grantor to 
convey all right, title and interest which grantor may 
own in the above property, heretofore conveyed to Cedar 
City Corporation for a street, in the event Cedar City 
Corporation vacates said street." What does this arnount 
to? It amounts to recognition that there was a street. 
This was accepted by Cedar Luntber and Hard,vare Com-
pany on the supposition that there was a street present. 
This is one of the n1ost revealing documents in the en-
tire line of this particular transaction. Bearing in mind 
that it was prepared by the defendant's attorney, was 
this the original deed that was prepared? It is quite ap-
parent that it was not. Certainly the defendant's attor-
ney did not voluntarily put in the words Hmay own''· in 
referring to any interest that Kate Wallace might have 
had, but simply shows that it \\ras the intention of the 
defendant at that tirne to acquire this- property from 
Kate Wallace without cost, have the City abandon same, 
and include it in the subdivision \Vhich ran to the West 
and the South of the property, and upon being approach-
ed to sign the deed referring to any reversion interest, 
said Kate Wallace had made the statement that she did 
not have any reversion interest, and had refused to sign 
any deed with any sort of a qualification clause on it. 
That thereafter, after considerable discussion, the deed 
had been redrafted and that all that Kate Wallace in-
tended to transfer \vas any interest she may olvn. Cer .. 
tainly this is not the action of a party who has intend· 
ed to retain in herself any fee interest or any other item. 
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Kate Wallace at that time was of the opinion that she 
had completely divested herself of the property, and that 
in her deed previously the fee interest had gone to her 
successors in interest on the various sides of the proper-
ty; that she could not be talked into signing a deed pur-
porting to convey any fee interest or reversionary inter-
est, and that she had refused to sign this deed until the 
insertion of the words "may own'~ were included. Cer-
tainly she signed the deed without consideration, a~'.d 
·with the stipulation that she did not claim anything in 
the property and that all she was signing was a quit 
claim deed. 
POINT IT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT FIND THA1., VACA'r-
ING A STREET PASSES TITLE TO THE FEE IN 
THE S'I'REET. 
The findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav/ as 
prepared by defendant's counsel amount to a finding that 
at the time of the vacation of the street by Cedar City 
Corporation, the East side thereof was owned by plaint· 
iff's predecessors in interest, and that as such they 
owned the fee to the center of the street in conformity 
with the statute, Title 27-1-7, Utah Code Annotated, 195:-' 
and 36-1-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, and that trans 
fer of the land bounded on the East of the street passed 
the title of the person \vhose estate was transfer1·ed to 
the tniddle of the street, and that at this time title was 
passed at the time of the conveyance to plaintifrs vari-
ous predecessors in interest from Kate Wallace and her 
predecessors in interest, and that each of these convey-
ances passed title to the middle of the street, and that 
even if there were a question as to whether or not there 
was a street before the deed to Cedar City Corporation, 
the correction deed thereafter from Kate Wallace to a 
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predecessor in interest of the plaintiff referring to the 
street, referred to the actual street and took any ques-
tion out of the matter, and if there was any fee interest 
still in Kate Wallace it was passed by the correction deed 
at that time. This is also exemplified and shown by the 
fact that at the time of the deed to the defendant, said 
Kate Wallace claimed nothing, and used the word "May" 
to sho\v that she \vas making no claim at all to any in-
terest in the property \vhatsoever, and felt that she had 
conveyed away any interest she m.ight have in the area, 
and was simply being talked into signing a deed. Under 
these conditions, the court's .finding that plaintiff's ·pre-
decessors in interest were the owners of the adjoining 
property at the tirne of the vacation of the street by Cedar 
City Corporation, amounts to a finding that they were 
the owners in fee of the East portion 9f the street, .. and 
that as such, the East two rods of the street came to 
them as owners of the fee and the fee in the adjoining 
property. 
There is no question that counsel for the defend.ant 
does not claim there \'vas any reversion to the grantor 
established by the deed to Cedar City Corporation. If so, 
why the following question on flage 11 of defendant-apu 
pellant's brief, "\Vhat if Kate Wallace had instead put 
in her deed 'only an easement for a public street over 
the above property is hereby conveyed and if Cedar City 
never opens up a street, or if opened and later vacated, 
the property shall revert to the grantor'?" Certainly this 
question would not be necessary if there had been any 
reversion. 
In the· case of Brown vs. Oregon Short Line, 102 Pac. 
7 40, 36 Utah 257, as a leading case on the subject, it is 
clearly shown that the court is justified in its finding 
that plaintiff is entitled to the property. In that case it 
was held "that a grantor in granting an easement may 
restrict his conveyance by apt words to the precise par· 
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eel of land intended to be conveyed, and he may reserve 
to himself the title to that portion of land within the 
street subject to the public easement, and if it appears 
that such was the intention of the party, the intention 
will prevail, and the land in the street, in case it is va-
cated, will revert to the grantor and not to the abutting 
owner." Counsel now wants to argue that the words "to 
use property for a street" amounted to reversion. This 
is indeed no so, and Kate Wallace did not think it was so. 
As a matter of statute, all that was conveyed by the 
deed was the right of use, and as a matter of stat-
ute, if there were any conveyances of any adjoining prop-
erty, they also conveyed to the center of the street un-
less the deeds specifically said otherwise. There is no 
place that any of the deeds have said otherwise, and 
certainly the corrective deed in November of 1950, after 
the property had been deeded to the city, passed on, where 
there was no reservation, any interest in the fee that 
was still existent. ~L\.lso it is clear that in the various 
references to the street on the West of the property, at 
the time of making the original deeds and the other cor-
recting deeds, said Kate Wallace was of the opinion that 
the property she was conveying was bounded on the 
west by a street, and that she intended to divest herself 
of the fee to the East ha1f of the street in these i terns 
also. In no place is there any reservation. If there was 
any question in anyone's mind as to her intent, the very 
fact that she refused to claim a fee interest in the street 
but simply said that she "may own" in the deed to the 
defendant, completely does away with any question of 
that nature. 
POINT III 
THE RULE THAT A CONVEYANCE OF LAND ABUT-
TING UPON A STREET ALSO CONVEYS TO THE 
CENTER 0~.., THE STREET HAS NO APPLI'CA TION 
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WHERE THERE IS NO STREET EITHER OPEN AND 
IN USE OR EXISTING BY MAP OR PLAT 1S FAL-
LACIOUS. 
This assun1es that before any city or public body has 
any interest or rights in any street that they must open 
and use same as such, or put it on a map or plat. This 
is not true The rules of law is that there are ways in 
which it can be found that a city or public body has ac-
cepted a particular street. 
There are also other ways in which it can be tound 
that a public body has accepted a particular street. If a 
city has not accepted a street and private individuals 
open it up, there still is not a public easerr1ent al-
though there may be a private easement establish-
ed, and if there is a private easement, abandonment 
of a public easement over the same property by a city 
does not do a\vay with a private easement When 
property is tendered by an individual to a city for 
a street, either in a subdivision or by any other tneans, 
the controlling factor on w·hether or not it is a street 
that can be vacated by ordinance or some other approp-
riate means of city govern1nent, is whether or not it is 
accepted by the city. In the Stipulation that is part of 
the record, in Paragraph 3, one finds the following: 
"That at some date after the 15th of March and 
prior to the 4th of :viay of 1950, at a date unknown 
to any of the parties, this deed was delivered by 
Kate Wallace to Cedar City and \vas recorded at 
the request of Cedar City. 'fhat at the time of said 
transaction, a street by the name of Dewey Avenue 
had been opened up North from the captioned street, 
running bet,veen 200 South and 400 South in Cedar 
City, Utah. That it \vas the intention of Cedar City 
Corporation to extend said Dewey Avenue to the 
South, and Cedar City Corporation accepted said 
deed for this purpose." 
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This amounts to an agreement by the parties that 
the deed and the property was accepted by Cedar City 
Corporation for a street. Under these conditions, where 
there is an agreen1ent that it was accepted for a street, 
the question of whether it was opened up or not, or put 
on a map or plat, has no bearing on the matter, as they 
were simply ways of showing acceptance. 
POINT IV 
THE INTENT OF KATE \\"PALLACE WAS TO CON-
VEY THE FEE OF Th~ EAST HALF OF SAID 
STREET TO THE ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNER 
ON THE EAST. 
This is shown by the fact that in every deed signed 
by Kate Wallace she referred to the street and required 
until the time of 1950 that the house be set back from 
the street on the West; that in 1950, after having deed-
ed this specific property to Cedar City for a street, she 
again deeded the property to the predecessors in interest 
of the plaintiff, on the East, and again failed in any way 
to make any reservation. There is no reservation at any 
point by Kate Wallace, and the cases and statute so hold 
that there is a presumption that the person does trans-
fer to the middle of the street. There is no question this 
was the intent of Kate Wallace and she herself indicat-
ed that it was her intent by the language of the deed 
that she signed which the defendant-appellant claims 
is the basis of its rights. The use of the word "n1ay" in-
dicates that she does not at any time claiin anything 
still in the property. On Page 20 of the defendant-appel-
lant's brief, in referring to the deed to the defendant, 
the word "may" has been left out. Is this an attempt 
to put something in the deed that is not correct, or to 
make the deed read different from what it actually did? 
Commenting upon the defendant-appellant's state-
ment on Page 22 and 23 of brief to the effect that some-
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one is attempting to get something for nothing, one has 
only to look at the deed whereby defendant claims to 
have acquired title from Kate Wallace, to find that the 
consideration was $1.00; that the notary was counsel 
for the defendant, and that there was no document 
stamp placed upon the deed, to ascertain who was 
trying to get something for nothing. An examination 
of the deed to the plaintiff from plaintiff's predeces-
sors in interest, reveals that for the property in ques-
tion and the four rods immediately adjacent thereto 
on the East, $2.20 in document stamps was placed on 
said deed by the persons selling the property. There is 
absolutely no question that Mrs. Wallace had no desire 
to retain anything to herself. The language in the deed 
to the City does not amount to a reversion. The stat-
utes very clearly indicate that anyone passing land 
bounded by a street passes title of the person whose es-
tate is transferred to the middle of the highway unless 
there is a specific exemption. In four deeds which Mrs. 
Wallace signed affecting the East boundary of the prop-
erty, there was no exception whatsoever, and in each of 
these deeds she referred to a street. One of them was 
after she had deeded the property in question to Cedar 
City and Cedar City had accepted and recorded this 
deed. Certainly the language of J\1rs. Wallace in the deed 
to the defendant does not claim any right whatsoever in 
the property. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, plaintiff-respondent claims that she 
did acquire the fee to the East two rods of said street 
from her predecessors in interest, when the predecessors 
in interest deeded to her the East two rods of said street 
and the adjoining four rods on the East, and that her 
predecessors in interest had acquired all rights to the 
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East two rods of said street at time of deeding by Mrs. 
Wallace and at the time of the abandonment by Cedar 
City Corporation. It is rather unique to notice that de-
fendant-appellant contends that there never was a street, 
inasmuch as he has by stipulation, agreed that Cedar 
City accepted the street, and accepted the property for 
a street. Also if there never was a street, how could it 
be abandoned by Cedar City? Inasmuch as the plaintiff-
respondent is the owner of the fee in the two rods in 
question by deed, and is in addition owner to the sur-
face rights by deed since the abandonment by Cedar 
City Corporation, the only conclusion there can be is 
that the plaintiff-respondent is entitled to have the title 
to the two rods in question quieted in herself, and that 
the decree of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Patrick H. Fenton, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
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